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:11 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF UTAH

S7ATE OF UTAH
Respondent

vs.

CASE NO. 12551

TOMMY OTIS FAIR

Appellant

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NA'TURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Tommy Otis Fair was convicted of
1

1'.n
1 'or

I

crime of illegal sale of a narcotic drug
the Third Judicial District Court in and

Salt Lake County.

;
I

I

i DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Appellant was charged with the crime of
I

selling a narcotic drug in violation.

o;' 1l_tah Code Anno. ( 1953) 58-13a-2 on October
1970 to a police informant one Gene Dawson.
-1-

Complaint was filed in the City Court of

3alt Lalrn City on November 17, 1970, and a
preliminary hearing was held on February 19,

1971.

Appellant was bound over to the

:Jistrict Court of Salt Lake County, information
March 12, 1971.

Jury trial before the

Honorable Judge Bryant H. Croft on April 14,

1971, returned the verdict of Guilty as charged
on April 15, 1971, and the Appellant was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term of 5 years to life,
(,aving waived the right to a time before
sentencing.

Commitment immediately issued and

the Appellant was returned to the Utah State
Prison to serve the sentence imposed concurrently with the prison sentence defendant
then serving due to a parole revocation of
J1nuory 1971, which parole was revolked due to
the pending criminal charges which are the

of this appeal.

-2-

Notice of Appeal was

:'aed by the appellant pro-se on April 22, 1971
with Designation of the Record on
;ppeal.

Record on Appeal was forwarded to

;ds Court on June 9, 1971, however timly

:ranscript of the proceedings in the lower
:ou:ct were not prepared, and the appellant
served one year of his sentence awaiting
;ne submission of the transcript to This Court.

was finally entered April 12, 1972.
:ELIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks a reversal of appellant's
conviction in the Third Judie ial District Court
and -an immediate release from the Utah State

Prison.
IS1'ATEMENT OF FACTS

I

On October 11, 1970 the appellant was at

1 ..

is apartment located at 322 Fjfth Ave., Salt
City, Utah at or around 4:00 P.M. when
Gene Dawson came to the house and requested

I

-3-

::1e defendant to sell him some narcotics.

(:-65 L-7).
i:

Dawson was an undercover agent

the-time working for the Salt Lake City

l:&rcotic Squad.
11

( T-9 L-26)

It was his job

set up deals and to purchase drugs

11

•

?fior to coming to appellant's home on October
ll, 1970 Dawson had met with Officer Hoffman,

Welch and Officer Elton (T-10 L-18).
h8.d been furnished a $10.00 bill by the
officers with which to cop.

After

ciscovering that Mr. Fair did not have a
11

stach 11 , he returned to Officer Welch who
waiting outside (T-17, L-21) and they drove
Officer Hoffman (T-17 L-22).

Dawson

and the off ice rs proceeded to make another

of narcotics, and an attempted buy
another source (T-37 L-12) and then returned
the appellants apartment at approximately

lo:30

P.M. (T-38 L-2).

Dawson was furnished

ic:acer Hoffman's automobile (T-38 L-25).
I

I

I

-4-

Dawson

,gain asked the appellant to cop for him and

informed the appellant that he was sick

(T-65 L-28) which the appellant believed to
that the undercover agent was having

;;£an

'::ithdrawals (T-66 L-15).

Dawson was known to

Fair as a narcotic adict and Dawson
requested the appellant as one narcotic addict

:o another narcotic addict to do him a favor

kid go

J11·-66

Icame
I

I

cop for him because he was sick.
L-27)

Appellant, Dawson and two girls

out of Tommy's apartment after the appellant
dressed and drove to West 2nd South (T-13
having first let the girls out of the
at the Camelot South Bar.

Appellant left

Do.1vson in the car and went to an apartment and
returned minutes later with two balloons (T-14
and passed them to Dawson.

Dawson then

C:'ove the appellant back to his apartment,
2·coping for a minute at the Kwikee Market.

-5-

(T-15

then met with Sergeant Elton who took
::1e ballons from Dawson (T-47 L-27) and took
;:1em to Mr. Hoffman 1 s house and from there to
:1is own home for the weekend before delivering
to the evidence room. (T-47 L-29).

Dawson

at the trial that he received money
;'rom the Salt Lake City Police department
11

occassionally, if there is some deal they
me to help them out with •••••

u

(T-16 L-24)

Upon the trial of this case, Judge Bryant
Ii,

Croft excused the Jury for conference with

council on the issue of entrapment, and without
recalling the Jury, heard the testimony of the
paid informer.
11

Judge Croft stated (T-31 L-11)

I 1 ve held this out of the Jury examination of
to give all of us an opportunity to

iicos hie tectimony with re.spect to how he

nappened to go to Fair on October llth 11 •

This

was taken for the purpose of the
Judicial determination of whether the issue

-6-

Following the testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses and the testimony of the
and his single witness called for
ihe purpose of challenging the credibility of
the agent provocateur Dawson, the Court submitted
-che case to the Jury, having instructed the

jury, which included the instruction on the
issue of entrapment. (R-20)

The Jury having retired to deliberate
defense counsel moved the court for a directed
rerdict which was denied.

(T-96 1-21)

Jury

returned a verdict of Guilty and the defense
Counsel moved for a judgment not withstanding
verdict.

Which motion was also denied.

Appellant waived the time for imposition of the
sentence (T-100 1-12).

Appellants trial counse 1

indicated to the Court that there was a conflict
in the legislation as to whether the penalty
Provided by the statutes was 5 to life or 0

i to 5

years.

I l::iposed

(T-101 1-15 & 1-19).

The Court

the sentence of 5 to life to run

-8-

concur:rently with any prior sentence which
appellant was serving, but stated that
if the conflict in the penalty provisions of

the narcotic laws was resolved by This Court
in pending cases that he could "correct an

illegal sentence and impose a valid

••

'I can always have him come

and correct

;!1at sentence •••

The Court then

11

(T-102 L-10).

the appellant with specificity as
;o the procedure for taking an appeal (T-103
L-11) •

Appellant submitted his own Notice of Appeal
Designation of the Record on Appeal and Affidavit
of Impecuniousity requesting the Court to

Provide counsel to assist in the appeal.

30-31)

(R 29-

Al though counsel was appointed by the
no order for transcript was prepared for

the signature of Judge Bryant H. Croft, until
ti1e /1ppellant found it necessary to obtain the

cervices of other counsel to· safeguard his

-9-

Order of transcript was signed on
1, 1972 and the transcript was
1'L1ELlly received by this court on April 12, 1972.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

TtUAL COURT EB.RED IN RECEIVING TESTD\10NY
0'11 11f\OSECUr11 ION WITNESS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
JUHY

Appellant

WQS

denied his

to a Trial by Jury, guaranteed by Article
Sec. 10 of the Constitution of the State of
by the exclusion of the jury during the
ca;:ing of testimony of the Prosecution witness

Dawson which testimony should have been
received by the Jury.
Utah Code Anno. (1953) 77-27-2 provides:
issues of fact must be tried by a jury but
in all cases except where a sentence of
dcG.t:1 may be imposed trial by jury may be
waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall
1Je made in open court and entered in the
minutes.

-JO-

The record is clear that the testimonJ
received in the absence of the jury brought
forth facts which were essential for the
Jury to hear and weight in order to adequately

make a determination on the issue of entrapment.
The record contains no waiver by the defendant
of the right to have the jury hear evidence
on all issues of fact.

Judge Croft stated, following the
testimony of Dawson during the absence of the
jury:

I've held this out of the jury(examination

of Dawson) to give all of us an opportunity

to hear his testimony with respect to
how he happened to go to Fair on October
the 11th ( T31-Lll)
Clearly this examination was for the

purpose of illiciting facts , facts which the
defense of entrapment put in issue.

Facts

which were necessary for the Jury to hear.
Answers from the witness which revealed the
entrapment process, in his own words, which
were never heard by the jury.
-11-

as a general rule on
':Chis Court has held I
•
IE ti,
facts will not be reviewed as the
.;2terri1ination of the facts are for the jury, who
a.re in a posit ion to observe the demeanor of the

cttness in addition to receiving the testimony.
This court stated in State v Ward, 10 Utah

39 (1960)

P 2, 865:

that it is the prerogative of the jury
to judge the credibility of the witnesses
:ind to determine the facts. 11
11

-cne following words:
It is our duty to
of the jury as the
credibility of the
determiners of the
11

respect the prerogative
exclusive judges of the
witnesses and as the
facts."_ (Emphasis added)

The obligation of the trial judge to respect
province of the jury should be no- less than

1

;nat of this Court, and the duty of the trial
court, when the case is tried before

jury, is

determine issues of law and to submit questions
1

ln'

J'.'act to the jury.

-12-

Following the testimony of Dawson during
r,e absence of the Jury, Judge Croft ruled that -

were questions of ract on the issue of
ntrapment which could not be decided_ as a
of law and he therefore submitted the
to the jury.
,01;

However, the jury were

appraised of all the facts for their

'dibcr:J.tion in reaching their decision.
Pi'c:j uclic ial error arose due to the Court 1 s
!failure to recall the jurors during the
'.ri-cerrogation of the witness, transcribed from
&ges 24 to 31 inclusive of the trial transcript,

which thereby constitutes grounds for reversal.

Such questions of fact have established that
t'.1e criminal design originated with the officials

and that the

11

criminal conduct was the

I1
1

oroduct of the creative activity' of the law

I

ler(orcement officials 11 •

u.s. 369 (1958).
-13-

Sherman v. United States.

Part of the testimony received in the absence
c: the jury is set forth herein as follows:
Jvir. Dawson?

,, Yes, sir.
Did you have a discussion either on this

day or prior to this day with the Police
officers involved, Officer Hoffman and
Officer Welch, concerning the making of a
buy

J

from Mr. Fair, the defendant?

·'· Yes sir, I am sure I had mentioned it
·oefore.
who suggested that you go see Mr.
Fair?
'

1

•

,,

':i;.

I.<

IJ,,

I believe I did.
Now,

do you remember distinctly or ••••

Yes, sir, it was me.
How did you go about deciding that?

That

I

you

should see Mr. Fair?

;,, I believe it was Jim Hoffman.
I daid,

11

r

I told him,

am fairly confident I can make

-14-

a buy from Tommy Otis Fair."
11

And he said,

Great, let's go do it."

(.. Nowagain, when you say

11

:make a buyn you mean

this procedure that you

by

is that

correct?
!, Yc:s,

purchase.

other words, you would give him the money
and he goes and purchases and he gives it

to you?
this time I expected Mr. Fair that he

i,, At

would have some, so •••••
You thought he would have a personal stach
or ••••
i,

Some that he had for sale, yes, sir.

·,And

then when you discovered that he didn't,

you subsequently went back to the police
officers and told them that he did not and
then after knowing that you attempted to
make a buy anyway?
''•I

believe I asked, "Do you want to go ahead

With the deal or not?"

-15-

And I believe it was

agreed upon mutually by everybody.
you were fully cognizant of the fact at
the time you finalized this transaction that

Mr. Fair did not have really any of these
narcotics?

You and the Police Department

and everybody involved knew or were fairly
c8rtain that he was going to go out and
purchase from somebody else and give it
to you, as opposes.... (argument of counsel
and Court omitted) At that time, it is my
understanding from your testimony, that you
knew Mr. Fair ••• you were fairly certain that

Mr. Fair didn't have a personal stash or
what you call it "a dig 11 ?
.\, Stash?
IIe didn't have a stash of Heroin in his
apartment and that he would have
this from someone else for you?
··· That is what I believed, yes sir.

-16-

to

purchase

, You, understood that at this time?
., I believed that he didn't have it from what
he told me.

, Did you cop, you say, two for the police

officers?
, Yes, I did.
,

they decided to go ahead by: this method?
in other words, by

Mr. Fair, giving

him the money, letting him make the purchase
o.nd come back and give it to you?

You all

set down and determined that this is the way
to go ahead and handle it?
A,

Tr1ey were aware that was the way it was going

to be handled.
All of the above testimony was relevant and
on the issue of the defense of
:r/crapment, and was certainly necessary for the
/0.ry to have the above statements to be able to

lcequately rule on the defense.

-17-

Jud3e Croft, who had heard all of this
stated to counsel following the retireoi the jury to deliberate (T-96 L-15-22):
I think the conflict in the testimony, as
I Tccall it, perhaps
it such that I
say as a matter of law that this is
::. r:lear entro.pmcnt; ·that there was no
on the part of Fair to make this
f:ale and he was coerced in it or conned into
lt by Dawson.
for that reason, I'll
icl; the ,-jury decj_de the case and for the
rrcord deny the Motion
directed verdict)
I think it is a close case.
::}pcllant was entitled. to

all testimony

·oy the Jury, as the trier of facts, and
;allure of the trial court to recall the
for the taking of the testimony was preto the Appellants right to a trial by

!Ir, Justice Stewart has stated:

o'

demands an independent and objective
of a district judge 1 s appraisal
own conduct of a criminal trial,
v United Sto.tes, 369 U.S. 438,

T1]5IJ.

"','ofcssor Orfield isolated three basic functions
CJ.Ptit.:als in criminal cases in Orfield, Criminal

s in America

(1939) as follows:

1y the chief
of an appeal
-"'' ;._ c:cimiDal case should be to see that
l;,::;
is done to the appellant. An
defend&nt must be released. A
ve:,'ct1daot who did not secure a fair trial
: ,ould h.:o,ve a.nother trial ••••
'1·o lo:::.e sic;ht of this purpose is to commit
-,.1;; o.:cic;j_nal sin o:C ;judicial procedure •••
;_;ubsti tution of the actual ends of
judjcature for the ends of justice.
i:t. l"o..i:c,

the appellant herein could not have,

C::.]Ji not receive a :.'.'air trial in light of the

i_on o c the jury from factual evidence
;.eeci_ect for their determination.

lo State v Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177,
- n.

lvl2-

I
I

I

I

I
'

II

tnis court said:
is the sole and exclusive province of
the jury to determine the facts in all
criminal cases, whether the evidence
o:::':i_'ered by the state is weak or strong,
ls in conflict or is not controverted.
may be ever so convincing that
o_n accused is guilty of the crime charged,
yet, it is for the jury and not for the
trio.,l judge to render the verdict. If the
trial judge may not find a verdict of
guilty, so, likewise he may not find any
oc' the facts which are necessary elements
o 1_· U1e crime for which the accused is being
G:cied.

-19-

The provision of our State Constitution
wnich grants accused persons the right
to trial by jury extends to each and all
of the facts which must be found to oe
9resent to constitute the crime charged,
such right may not be invaded by the
presiding judge indicating to the jury
"Chat any of such facts are established by
Ghe evidence. The constitutional provision
1-:ia:,r not be disregarded under the pretext
that there is no conflict in the evidence
or that the evidence will permit of but
one finding. When an accused enters a
plea of not guilty, he has a right to
have his entire case submitted to the
jury unless he waives such right by expressly
admitting at the trial the existence of some
;uct or facts which is or are put in issue
by the plea of not guilty.
hppellant was entitled to have all of the
submitted to the jury from which they
ould ascertain the facts.

This Court has stated in State of Utah v.
l'.am.mion, 19 Utah 505 (19c,')).
That which the law requires and makes
essential in the trial of persons
&ccused of a felony can not be dispensed
with, neither by the consent of the
Ecccused nor by his failure to object to
unauthorized methods pursued by those in
authority.
·?Pellant did not waive the right to have all
:ssues of ;act tried before the jury, and the
:cstimony received out of the presence of the jury
is Prejudicial error and grounds for reversal.

POINT II
UN:SESS THE QUESTION OF ENTRAPMENT CAN BE

DECIDED AS A l'l,.ATTER OF LAW, THE ISSUE OF
EHTfZJ, E>IENT IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE
DE'l ERMINJ\ TION OF THE JURY
1

This Court has recently considered the
de;ense of entrapment in the case of State
Kasai, opinion filed April 6, 1972, Case

# 12585, wherein the Court stated:
Entrapment is not established as a
matter of law, where there is any
substantial evidence in the record
from which it may be inferred that
the criminal intent to commit the
particular offense originated in the
mind of the accused.
This Court found that under the facts
established in that case, that Gene Dawson,
the undercover agent, went to the home of

Kasai,as prearranged with Officer Hoffman,
in November, 1970 and made a purchase of

r;iarijuana with $10.00 which had been supplied
·oy the Narcotics squad.

This Court upheld the

conviction of Kasai as there was substantial
evidence of an immediate sale to Gene Dawson

or

the narcotic from the residence of Kasai.
-21-

Facts in the instant case are
i':ne same undercover agent, Eugene Dawson, naving
prearranged with the same officer Hoffman to
111aKe

a buy from the appellant.

$10. 00 cash

furnished by the officers to the undercover
ex addict to make the purchase.

This is where

all similarity ends, and the entrapment process
commenced.

In Kasai, the accused, when approachec

in his front yard by Dawson requesting that

Kasai sell him some marijuana, immediately
obliged the agent and went into his residence,
a few minutes latter with the drug.
In the instant ·appeal, Dawson went into the

apartment of the appellant, was informed that
M:c.

Fair did not have any narcotics, and believed

that Mr. Fair did not in fact have any herion

for sale.

No arrangements were made with the

appellant in the afternoon of October 11, 1970
by l'fr.

Dawson to return to obtain the drugs

requested.

The evidence revealed that following

unsuccessful attempt to obtain drugs from
the appellant, that the officers and Mr. Dawson
-22-

,:.h·ned their attention to making buys from

ot:1er sources.

That at approximately 8:30

?.iil. the narcotic's squad decided to try

Fair apartment again.

'.;he

Agent Dawson,

returned to the apartment.
lyinG down.

He had company.

cirur·;s for sale.

Mr. Fair was
He had no

Gene Dawson, known previously

:o ?.Ir. Fair as a heavy drug user, having been
circulation for som.e time, appealed
vO

'l'om:my Otis Fair, addict to addict, for

;·:eip-nelp which Tommy Otis Fair knew could
only come from the relief that a

supply.

11

fix

11

would

Thus, fully convinced that the agent

::eed8d his help to "cop 11 , the appellant was
dtiven to West 2nd South, in Salt Lake City.
TranscripL. of the trial reveals that Mr.
?:ir did not even direct :Lvlr. Dawson to the
location where the drug could be obtained,
Dawson knew where Tommy would have to

ov.c,

for him.

The only thing Tommy did not

no1·1 that night, was that Dawson was faking,
1

no.t ·Ghe

addict was now the agent, and that

:rhen Torn.my ''coped" as a friend he was in

This Court stated in State v Pacheco
15

---

Utan 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494

in

'

6iscussing the entrapment methoJs of law
enforcement departments:
This is so discordant to the
true flillction of law enf'orcement
which is the prevention, not the
causation of crime; and so repugnant
to fundamental concepts of justice that
t!1e conviction of an accused under such
circumstances will not be approved.
Two leadinG Federal cases decided by the
Court of the United States have assisted
Courts of this Nation with guidelines on
the defense of entrapment.

In Sherman v

united States, 356 U.S. 369, (1952) the Court's
opinion was delivered by IVrr. Chief Justice
0arre.n who stated:
In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
this Court firmly recoe;nized the defense
o; entrapment in the federal courts •••••
T:1e function of law enforcement is the
prevention of crime and the apprehension
of criminals. Manifestly, that function
does not include the manufacturing of
crime. • • •
However, the fact that government
agents 11 merely af:i:"ord opportunities or
f"acilities for the cornrnission of the
o:i_':i:"ense does not 11 co.ns ti tute entrapment.
-S.nt:capuent occurs only when the criminal
conduct was 11 the product of the creative
o.ctivity 11 of law-enforcement officials.

that entrapment was established

JL'.Stice Warren's opinion did not end
conclusion, but continued on to

:·1.J..

e:<)la:Ln the function of t:1e Jury when the
ent:ccpment is raised, he stated:
••.. where the issue has been
presented to them, the Court of
.·1)pc,1.ls have since Sorrells unanimously
concluded that unless j_t ca:i:1 be decj_ded
._,::;
1:1;.:i.tter of lnv1, ·L;hc issue of whether
a
has been· en·L;rnpped is for
\·.[1e j m·y as part o:Z' its function of
deter:n1ining the guilt or innocence of
·L;l1e ace used.

:Ls:;uc o(

Court's are faced with a threshold
to be made by the Trial Judge
the de.fense of entrapment is
First it must be ascertained
',1;1ethcr the evidence clearly show's entrapment
a i118.tter of law.

c:o:nduct the

11

That is, was the criminal

product of the creative activity

o,' the law-enforcement officials.
u..La the government agents

11

11

? Or,

merely afford

1J{J1)0.:_··i,unities or facilities for -the commission
o :· ·L;11c oZfense 11 ?
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If the Trial Judge is convinced that the
de..c'ense of entrapment is clearly shown in any
Given situation as it is based upon the guidelines of the Appellate Courts, then it behooves
i1im to rule on the issue as a matter of Law and

dismiss the case, or, in the alternative,to give
a directed verdict. However, if facts are con-

j i'licting
I

and reasonable minds differ in weighing

....·(

testimony of prosecution and Defense witnesses,
it

should be the duty of the Trial Judge to sub-

ult the entire case to the Jury.

In United States V. Henry 417 F 2d 267,269,
(1969) (2d Cir, C.A.) Judge Moore stated that the:

I

f

Courts in this Circuit since 1952 have consistantly treated the defense of entrapment
under the two-element formulation promulation
proporrnded by Judge Learned Hand in the first
Dppeal in United States. v. Sherman, 200 F 2d
880, 882, (1952):
Two questions of fact arise: (1) did the
agent induce the accused to commit the
offense charged in the indictment; (2) if
so, was the accused ready and willing without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense.On
the first question the accused has the burden;
on the second the prosecution has it.
Judge Hand's opinion defines the
-26-

11

inducement

11

1

P-s inclu6in.s; 11 solicitine;", proposing,
initiatinz, broacting or suggesting the
com:i:iis.s ion of the o:Z'fense char;:red 11 -'Q'
at b 3. Thus the defendant's burden
introducing an issue of fact
''
II.
·c.ne
in d ucemen:c' II ,oy a Government agent c
or informer is relatively slight. On
the other hand the Government's burden
to snow justificaJcion for the inducement
through the defendants' propensity
to commit the crime when the opportunity
is thus made availaole is more difficult.
0

•

Evidence in the instant appeal record
reveetls that the agent provocateur, with the
and at the direction of the Narcotics
o,','icers of Salt La:ke City Police Department,
and initiated the contact with
Appellant.

That the broaching and

suGgesting of the supplying of the narcotics
Dawson, was at the aga."'1.ts insistence and
p:cetense of need , which

he

knew could be

understood by the appellant.
?urther, the evidence submitted by the
falls very short of the requirement
the burden of_ proof of the prosecution to
justification for the pretense of the
in soliciting the Appellant to "cop" for
nim.
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Tr1e courts refuse to convict an
entrapped defendant, not because his
conduct falls outside the nroscription
of the statute,
even if
his guilt be adnitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government
to bring about conviction cannot be
couo·cenanced. Sherman -v United States '
Supra, Cone urring opinion, Justice

Dictum contained in the concurring
opinion in Sherman, is closely related to
ti-H.;

situation of the appellant, Tommy Otis
uc follows:
• • • a test that looks to the
character and predisposition of the
rather than the conduct of
t:1e police loses sight of the underlying
reason for the defense of entrapment.
No matter what the defendant's past
record and present inclination to
criminality, or the depths to which he ras
sunk in the estimation of society,
certain police conduct to ensnare hime
into further crime is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society. • • • The possibility that no matter what his past
crimes and general disposition the
defendant might not have committed the
particular crime unless confronted with
inordinate inducements, must not be
ignored. Past crimes do not forever
outlaw the criminal and open-him to
police practices, aimed at securing his
repeated conviction, from which the
ordinary citizen is

-28-

This Court has stated in State v Pacheco,

13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P. 2d 494:
When that issue is present, the

question is whether the crime is
product of defendant's own
intention and desire or is the
product of some incitement or
inducement by the peace officer. If
the crime was in fact so instigated or
induced by what the officer did that
ti1e latter's conduct was the generating
cause which produced the crime and
without which it would not have been
conunitted the defendant should not
be convicted.

POINT III
;1'HE

TRIJl.L COlli\T ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT 1·

liIOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
Analizing the evidence produced by the
testimony of the witnesses below,_ Appellant
request this Court to consider the following

iacts in light of the prevailing law of
the defense of entrapment, and to find that
there was sufficient evidence from

the

Court should have ruled on the defense
as a Matter of Law.

rant

Eugene Dawson had not seen the apfor several months, due to Dawson's conin the Salt Lake County jail, following
from the Federal Narcotic's Hospital.

r-79

L-18)
T{1a,t

prior to the witnesses incarceration in

be Comity jail, and subsequent to his release from
lederal Narcotic's Hospital, the witness had
a heavy user of herion. (T-76 L-16)

I·

'riiat the .1\ppellant did not have any reason to

lelieve -chat the witness, Dawson, was not con-

lir,uinr; the use of the drug.

!

I.

'fhat the evidence did not reveal that the
1

s officers had any probable cause to

that the Appellant was trafficking the

I

tirug.
Tna t

relative

the testimony of the witness Dawson
-CO

the time IS Which he had preViOUSly

tee -ci1e !1ppellant, was impeached by the proof of

ty.
him.

(T-78 L-22)

/"'ir.

I

It was

1

68 when I

I met him through Joe Shecosi 11 •

_,ony o,' Euo.;ene Dowson.
I

11

Test-

Testimony of Tommy Otis

(T-81 L-2,9)
Do you recall his stating that he met you

Yes
-,das that possible?
Impossible
I

\Thy?

11·.-,.

I was in the Utah State Prison.

,;,

During the entire calendar year 1968?
was.

I

That other evidence which might have been

c,

to impeach the testimony of the witness
was ruled immaterial by the Trial .Judge.

J:;11.son,

('1'-'('6 1-22), where in fact, the issue of who was
·-. i

v....

e' :i cna ·n \I
.1

•

'

in other words the supplier of the
-

'

dtugs when the witness and the appellant

i cope'
I

c

'I

shot

together, was material to the issue of

Ij credioili ty of the witnesses.
7

11

.

':'hat the undercover agent was not successful

in i1is attempt to have the appellant

>ir.-, w:1en

ne

11

cop 11 for

first approached him on the afternoon

of October 11, 1970.

T:1at the officers and the undercover man,
ieri.ovming that the Appellant did not have any
1forcotic s for sale, returned the same evening

8:30 P.M. and convinced the appellant
-31-

that he was sick and needed a fix and that
:ie did not have any contacts arounc:l

and

finally persuaded the appellant to get dressed
anci go

11

cop

11

for him.

purchase the

In other words, to

from another, with the

v1itnesses money, from the place where the
11itness has driven t'."le appellant.

As

the

defense counsel stated (T 7-L 18),"He acted
as a conduit.

He wasn't intent on selling this

Heroin to the person Eugene Dawson. He was
,;;ercly intent on helping a person who was in
physical need, who had a habit and had to
maintain 'that habit.

11

Appellant submits to this Court, that
the crime with which the appellant was
convicted was in fact
duced

11

so instigated or in-

by what the officer did that the
conduct was the generating cause which

p:coduced the crir!E and without which it would
not have been committed.ll

State v Pacheco,supra

etnci tho,t the Trial JudGe erred in not ruling

that the defense of entrapment was established
as a :r.1atter of law.

POINT IV
T\'Il'1S DENIED THE ?,IGHT TO A FAIR JURY
['IU,L BY HIS APPEARi-\NCE IN COURT IN THE AFFAIR
OF A PEISONER, AND REFERENCES THERETO.

i

1v1,mdatory appearance in court at a jury
ti'ia1 by an incarcerated defendant in the attire
o:'

prison clothing is prejudicial to the defendof a fair trial.

an cs r

3tandards Relating

Trial by Jury

11ii1erican Bar 1'.ssociation Project on
Li1:i..r,1Lu11

Standards for Criminal Justice provides

cs :i:'o llows

:

J: .1 (b)

An incarcerated defendant or
should not be required to appear
in court in the distinctive attire of a
prisoner or convict.
on Section

4.1

(b) states:

The presumption of innocence requred the
of innocence 11 as confusion or embarrassment
11

of t:18 person and jury prejudice can result from
:io&ring the clothing of a convict or prisoner
·c,

as it can from wearing of shackles.

115 Colo. 488,

Eaddy

P. 2d 717

standard is intended to prevent the
1

c1J)t:c:i.:cance of a defendant or witness in garwhich if effect are a nbrand of incar11

Ti·,e person may appear in unmarked garments

.supplied by the custodial authorities although even
ti1is would seem unnecessary if the incarcerated

pe:cson has suitable civilian clothing.
1

11,

Collins

,Stc:cte: 70 Okla. Crim. 340, 106 P 2d 273, (1940).
In the instant case, Tommy Otis Fair, was

;·Drouc;ht from the Utah State Prison to stand jury
It appears from the transcript (T-5)

,

:;r1.1·c l-"1is physical appearance in court prompted
dci'ense attorney to :wake an explanation as

,

'to l;11e defendants appearance and to explain the

of why guards from the pen were present
1

wi"cr1 the accused in the courtroom.

'
I

Ti1e 1LB.l\. Standard.§_ suggest that the
sto.:ndard applies to all defendants and witnesses.

: Tim appellants only witness produced at the jury
ttial was Johnny Jones, a fellow inmate at the
?eni

No record was made infering any
of appearance of this witness.
lfr. Jones was called as a defense witness

a11C was examined relative to his knowledge of

'''..: 1uel1avior of the prosecution witness Dawson
re la ti ve to drugs.

It is quite obvious that when a witness
ap}ears in prison grab for the purpose of

1

ic:peaching the credibility of the prosecution
t1icness that such appearance may create a
pteJudice in the minds of the jury as the jury
w'.i.s in a position not only to hear testimony but

.to t:;a.in impressions as to which of two or more
they should believe.

Such appearances

the defendant and his only witness in custody
2x1d clothed with the stigma of being at present

a felon, could be weighed against the appearance
of che law inf or cement off ice rs and the under.cover agent, then appearing not as a law breaker,
2-s a re formed drug adict and al though the
e11 Ldence of recent jail time,

subsequent to

release from the Federal Narcotic 1 s Hospital
c.nd o:t other infractions of the laws by Eugene
, J.F:i·;Json

were presented orally, the comparison of

cn1s witness in his new habit was allowed to be

ocse;rved by the jury, and compared with the
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del°endant and his witness could allow the jury
to r:12cke impressions, not based upon the testi;Jony as to the relative credibility of the

\'l.:.tnesses.

The well known expression

pie ture is worth a thousand words 11 ,

11

0ne

is applicable

.:.n this instance.

Fair expressed the situation well in
:1is remarks to the Court, out of the presence of

:tile ,jury, appearing on page 84 of the trial

;;:ccrnscript, "What is it that makes him so
and makes hirn so true up there in spite

•of all the things he do? 11

Appellant believes

coat his appearance in court in the custody of

prison authorities and the prison garb, as well
: as similar appearance of the appellant's only

v1itness created such an unfair impression upon
che jury that the appellant was denied his
!

cO

a fair jury trial.

-36- ,

POINT V
U:CL.ii _Q__ODE ANNO. (1953) 58-13a-L;.Lj. (8) PHOVIDED

UNCONSTI'I'UTIONAL SENTENCE FOR THE SALE OF
N1\RCOTIC DRUG.

. Appellant was sentenced by Judge Bryant
E. C:co:Lt

11

to the Utah State Prison for the
indeterminate term as fixed by law
;or the crime of Unlawful Sale of
a Narcotic Drug of 5 years to life. 11
(T 102)

YIT.

Fair's defense counsel called attention

to the Court that the penalty provision of the
law were not clear as to the term of
ir;,prisonment to be imposed.

Judge Croft

acknowledged that if the sentence was not
proper

that the defendant could be returned to

his court for re-sentencing.
It is the contention of the appellant
that the penalty provisions of Utah Code
(1953)

I '

as amended 1969, is

unconstitutional for the following reasons:
58-13a-LJ.4

Utah Code Anno. _Ll.953) as

amended 1969, expressly
---------

forbids the release of

u co_nvict sentenced under this provision "until

ne

has served not less than three years in

Prison.

11

during which time the prisoner
..., '7

11

shall

i10-c

be eligible for release upon completion of

sen·::.ence or on parole or on any oti:ler basis. 11
This provision is an encroachment upon
of the Judiciary and the Executive
Departments of the State of Utah and is in
violation of the Constitutional division of
0owers set forth in Article V Section I,

of Utah

which provides as

follows:
The powers of the govermi1ent of the
Gtate of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative.
tile Executive, and the Judicial; and
no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
In accordinance with the provisions of

f,rticle VII, Section 12, Constitution of Utah,
the Board of Pardons, an executive department
-Che State of Utah, is granted the power to
1
:

remit fines and forfeitures, commute

and crant pardons after convictions, in all
cases except treason and impeachments.

II

Constitution further provides in the
same section of Article V:

Governor shall have the power to
crant respites or reurieves in all
cases of conviction for offenses against
the State, except treason or conviction
on ir;1peacrunent ••••
Legislation limiting the Constitutionally
ielecated powers of the Executive Department,
o.s set :i:'orth in Sec. 58-13a -44 (8)
as

.

u.c.A.

(1953)

amended, is unconstitutional, and penal ties
by the Court in accordance with any of

tne

provisions limiting the powers of the Board

of Pardons, Governor and Judiciary must be set asi

Parenthetically, the unconstitutionality
the penalty provisions of the Uniform Narcotics
have been repealed by the enactment of the
Controlled Substances Act, Effective January 1,

1972, which does not limit the powers of any of th
and Judicial branches of government.
Such enactment indicates a Legislative inten
co correct the errors of the Law which were only i
e/1,ect approximately 18 months before the State
Lcr.sislators acted to correct the ambiguous and
uncunstitutional law by the passage of

the very

clear, concise, and enlightening language of the
-39-

Co:-n:.rolled Su-ostances Act, Title 58, Cha.p-r.er

37, ,Yt<:-h C?de Anno. (1953) Amended, 1971,
' effective January 1, 1972.
It is acknowledge6 that the provisions
of the subsequent legislation have no application to the Appellant.

Mention of the act

is for the express purpose of indicating to
This Court that the question of the constitutionality of 58 -13a-44 (8) is now moot by
Lhe s ubecq ucnt le[iisla ti on, but the illcgali ty
of the penalty imposed upon the appellant
herein neve.!1-the-less, must be decided
retroactively, to the date of the Appellant's
sentence and the legislation then in effect.
Article V Section 1, Constitution of
Utah , has been construed by this Court in

v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.
2d

378, (1970) in a suit for declaratory

,judgment, brought by the Governor against the
President of the State Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, to have This
Court determine the validity of a statute which
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allowed the appointment o-.T three members
to the State Board of Higher Education, by

the presiding officer of each house of the

legislature.

This Court held that the

legislative enactment was unconstitutional
as being in violation of the division of

powers of Article V, Section 1, Constitution
of Utah.

The opinion stated in part: @ 389:

In all the states and in the
federal system as well, those delegated
powers have been divided into three
departments of government: the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial; and to
insure the stability and continuance of
this form of government and to secure
unto themselves enduring liberty and
freedom from tyranny, the people wisely
wrote into their constitutions provisions
similar to our own Article V, Section 1,
which absolutely prevent any person
charged with powers properly belonging
to one department from exercising any
of the functions appertaining to either
of the others-except where the power was
expressly so granted in the Constitution
itself.
If the provisions of U.C.A. (1953) 58-13ashould be determined to be a valid
exercise of the legislative powers, such
provisions contained therein limiting the
Judicial and the Executive powers, would
effectively repeal by implication the following
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statutory provisions:
' :Jtah Code Anno. (1953) 77-35-17:
Upon a plea of guilty or conviction
of any crime or offense, if it appears
compatible with the public interest, the
court having jurisdiction may suspend
the imposition or the execution of
sentence and may place the defendant
on probation for such period of time
as the court shall determine.
Utah Code Anno. (1953) 77-62-3:
(a) It shall be the duty of the board
of pardons to determine by majority
decision, when and under what conditions,
subject to the provisions of this act,
persons now or hereafter serving sentences,
in all cases except treason or impeachments,
in the penal or correctional institutions
'
of this state, may be released upon parole,
pardoned, or may have their fines or
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences
commuted or terminated; • • •
(b) Nothing contained herein shall be
construed as a denial of or limitation
on the governor's power to grant respites
or reprives in all cases of convictions
for offenses against the state, except
treason or conviction on impeachment;
Each of the above statutory provisions
are laws of a general nature.

Article 1,

24, Constitution of Utah provides:
All laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation.
S8-13a-44

(8),

u.c.A., by not allowing the

Courts to grant release by probation, consistent
with the provisions of 77-35-17, u.c.A. (1953)
•

I

I

•

-

--

-

..

and it is also contrary to the equal
clause of the Fourteenth A:rn.endment
o_" the _9ons ti tut ion of The United States.

Appellant submits that the Legislature acted
in

excess of it's authority in passing the Penalty

:)rovisions of the amended Uniform Narcotics Act
revoked the Court's power to exercise the
i

Judicial determination of suspension of sentence
v.1' c;rant of probation to offenders of a limited

c:,·cuc_;ory of crimes, which offences are made crimes,
not within the Penal Code, but pursuant to the
violations of the Business Regulation Code.
Obvious limitations of the powers of the
Judiciary and Board Of Pardons for violations of
Gi1e

act under the Business Regulation Division of

the State Government, while curtailing the right

and authority to grant suspended sentences and

Probation for all similar offenses under the
Penal Code is an invidious and Unconstitutional

cliscrimination and this Court should not uphold it,
ccs it ma·kes a mockery of our State Constitution.
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The status of an

law has

";Je discussed by the Supreme Court of the United

states as follows:
An unconsititutional law is void and
is no Law. An offense created by it
is not a crime. A conviction under it
is not merely erroneous, but is illegal
and void, and cannot be a Legal cause of
imprisonment. Ex Parte Siebold,100 U.S.
3'11, (1879)
To the same effect, the Court stated in
• • • it is clear that if the local
statute W1der which Royall was indicted
be
to the Constitution, the
prosecution against him has nothing upon
which to rest, and the entire proceeding
against him is a nullity • • • • Ex.Parte
110 U. s. 654, it was said that
if the statute prescribing the offense
for which Yarbough and his associates
were convicted was void, the court which
tried them was without jurisdiction, and
they were entitled to be discharged.
The statute providing for the penalty
under which the appellant was sentenced,
.

( 8), being void as repugnant to

the Constitution of Utah, and the Constitution

o; the United States, is the penalty provision
only.
Appellant was convicted for a violation of
and submits that the law in force

=1

the time of sentencing on April 15, 1971

: did contain a valid Penalty section as follows:

Any person vj_ola ting any other
prov ion of t:1is chapter, except those
classified as a raisdemeanor, or for which
special ir1pr5_sornnent and fine provisions
have specified above, upon conviction shall
be punished by ti1e first offense by fine
of not less than $1,000.nor more than
;)10,000 or by imprisd.n:ment in the Utah State
Prison lor not less than one year or by
oath such fine and imprisonment • • • •
It is conceeded that this provision does not
con(,u.j_n the violations of the Constitution in 5(3-

and that Jc he provisions of sub-section

(1.:::_) 2.re applicable to 58-13a-2.
I,1

v. J_§,PP, 26 Utah 2d 392,

P 2d 33L1,

(1971) this Court ste.ted that:

In case of doubt or uncertainty as to the

degree of the crime, he is entitled to the
lesser; and correlated thereto; that as to
Pn alternative between a severe or lenient
punishment he is entitled to the latter.
T[1is decision is not tmli1rn State v
Utah

U:e: 11 2d

22

u.

353, lLl-0 P 670

State v Fair 23

456 P 2d 168 (1969); State v Shondel

2d 343, 453 p 2d 146 (1969).

In the mnttcr of ,State

.::!_

Shondel, ibid, this

Court stated:
It has previously been adjudicated that
when the v:rong sentence ras been imposed,
the correct procedure is to impose the
proper sentence. Sta_,.:;e v Justice, 44 Uto.h

484, 141

p

109.

-

CONCLUSION
Trial JudGe erred in denying the
op)ellants Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Directed Verdict and Motion for Judgment
the Verdict, as

the facts

cleo.rly indicated that Entrapnent had been
as a matter of lav1; Appellant was denied
L;:1e

ric:1t to a fair Jury Trial by holding testi-

mony on the issue of entrapment out of the
presence of the jury, and by the appearance

o: the defendant and his witness in the custody

o:

the prison officials, and garbed

i1lJ.r1:.:: of felons; Utah Code Anno.

in the

(1953) 58-13a-

repealed, was unconstitutional and
the sentence pronounced thereunder is void.
Respectfully Submitted

Myrna Mae Nebeker

